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en particulier leur concentration dans le temps, sur les prix des denrées alimentaires
que se procurent les bénéficiaires de l’aide sociale. Nous présentons tout d’abord un
modèle théorique dans lequel les individus ayant des revenus relativement plus
faibles s’avèrent être relativement moins mobiles. Il en découle que lorsque leurs
consommateurs deviennent plus pauvres (cela se produit lorsque les bénéficiaires de
l’aide sociale ont épuisé leur prestation mensuelle), les marchands locaux de
denrées alimentaires exercent un plus grand pouvoir de marché, ce qui se traduit par
des prix plus élevés. Nous vérifions ce résultat théorique à l’aide d’une expérience
naturelle qui nous est offerte grâce à la plus grande concentration dans le temps des
paiements d’aide sociale à Montréal (Québec, Canada) qu’à Bangor (Maine, USA).
Nous trouvons que : i) Les prix des denrées diminuent de manière significative lors
de la semaine pendant laquelle les paiements d’aide sociale sont faits ; ii) Les prix
des denrées croissent de manière significative durant les autres semaines du mois.
Nous trouvons également que certains facteurs socio-économiques liés à la pauvreté
(par exemple le pourcentage de familles monoparentales dans un quartier donné)
sont associés à des prix des denrées plus élevés.
Abstract : We study whether social welfare recipients may end up paying more for
their grocery if social welfare payments are more concentrated over time. We first
present a theoretical model showing that lower incomes in general and a lower lower
bound of the income distribution lead to less mobility for poorer consumers. This
causes local stores to have more market power and increase their prices when the
incomes of poorer people go down and/or when the number of poorer people goes
up. Secondly, we verify these theoretical findings by using a natural experiment to
study links between food prices and the more restrictive timing of social welfare
payments in Montreal, Canada compared to the timing in Bangor, Maine. We find
some statistically significant evidence of : i) a negative effect on prices in the week of
social welfare check issue  ; ii) increasing prices over a month. We also find that
some socio-economic factors such as a higher percentage of single-parent families in
one area may increase prices charged by grocery stores in that area.
Keywords : Welfare Payments, Grocery Prices, Poverty




1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many empirical studies compare the relative costs of food for low-income and high-income households. 
Those studies tend to show that on average poor people pay more for their grocery items than richer 
people. 
  
An analysis of the fact that poorer people might pay more than richer people for their groceries was first 
done by Alcaly and Klevorick (1971). They find that poorer people pay slightly more because: i) the 
proportion of independent food stores in their neighborhood is higher (prices are higher in these stores
3) 
and ii) mobility constraints exist (e.g.: transportation cost) leading low income individuals to go more to 
closer stores than do higher income people.
4 Kunreuther (1973) confirms those findings and shows that 
income and storage constraint lead lower income consumers to buy smaller product sizes and to go more 
to smaller stores located near their home. Doti and Sharir (1981) show that because the value of 
shopping time increases with income, higher income people buy larger sizes and spend less time 
shopping for grocery products. Therefore, low-income households often pay more given that a larger 
size product has a lower cost per unit and that buying larger sizes means less visits to stores. Blaylock 
(1989) obtains similar results.  
 
More recent studies show mixed evidence on the fact that poorer people may pay more. MacDonald and 
Nelson (1991) don’t provide statistically significant evidence that low-income consumers pay higher 
prices for food than higher-income consumers. Chung and Myers (1999) find that poor people pay more 
since there is a disproportionate distribution of non-chain stores in poor neighborhoods.  Therefore, they 
are more likely to shop in smaller grocery stores and convenience stores which sell at higher prices than 
chain stores. Hayes (2000) denies that poor people pay more based on the fact that preceding studies 
used bias samples.  
 
In the present paper we look at a new aspect of why some poor consumers may end up paying more, that 
is: Does the timing of the social welfare payments lead grocery stores to charge higher or lower prices? 
Do social welfare recipients pay more for their groceries independently of the size of the products or of 
the costs of going to stores? Related to that hypothesis is a paper by Wilde and Ranney (2000) in which 
they show that the average expenditure by social welfare beneficiaries (receiving food stamps or money) 
                                                     
3 See Tanguay et al. (1995).  
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reaches a peak 3 days after the reception of the stamps or money. Because these households adjust their 
spending on the receipt of the welfare payments, we can think that economic agents informed of when 
they receive their stamps or money might try to take advantage of that information. For example, if 
social welfare recipients all receive some money at the same date, there would be a sudden increase in 
the demand for food and the grocery stores knowing that might react by adjusting their prices.  
 
To answer these questions, we first present a theoretical model inspired by Hotelling’s spatial-monopoly 
model. It emphasizes the existence of mobility constraints which lead to local food stores having some 
market power. We show that lower incomes in general and especially a lower lower bound of the 
income distribution, lead to more consumers having no choice but to go to the local store. This causes 
local monopoly prices to increase when the incomes of poorer people go down and/or when the number 
of poorer people goes up. 
 
Hence, if one examines the income distribution on a weekly basis (weekly available money) and views 
the money available to social welfare recipients as the lower bound of the income distribution, is it true 
that prices are higher when social welfare recipients have just received their checks (as claimed by some 
welfare defense groups
5)? Or is it rather that prices are higher a few weeks later when welfare recipients 
have spent part of their monthly benefit and are then relatively poorer? Second, is it the case that local 
stores in “lower income” neighborhoods sell at higher prices?   
 
To test how social welfare effects price levels, we proceed using a natural experiment that involves two 
independent regions with different social welfare systems: Montreal, Quebec, Canada and Bangor, 
Maine, USA. The differences between these regions allow us to isolate the effects that the frequency of 
social welfare payments might have on the pricing of grocery stores. An econometric analysis is done to 
explain variations in weekly prices prevailing in 11 grocery stores (7 for Montreal, 4 for Bangor) for 60 
products (31 for Montreal 29 for Bangor), for 26 weeks. 
 
Results support the presented theoretical model. We find some statistically significant evidence of: i) a 
negative effect on prices in the week of social welfare check issue; ii) increasing prices over a month. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
4 On that subject see also Holly and Wheeler (1971). 
5 In Quebec, the « Association coopérative d’économie familiale (ACEF) », a consumer association, studied that possibility 
in a 3 year study for 94 products. Their results indeed confirm that major grocery stores offer less rebates and lower rebates in 
the weeks welfare payments are made. On the other hand, their methodology is flawed because they don’t control for the 
costs and the nature of the products, seasonal factors and the size of stores.  
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We also find that some socio-economic factors may have an impact on the pricing by grocery stores. For 
instance, we find that a higher percentage of one-parent families in a neighborhood may lead to higher 
prices, ceteris paribus.
6 Our results are related to those of Benson and Faminow (1984) who show that 
less mobile consumers are more vulnerable to the rent-seeking behavior of food stores. The novelty of 
the present paper is to show that the timing of social welfare payments may alter social welfare 
recipients’ mobility and therefore the prices they pay for food.  
 
These results imply that the timing of social welfare payments may have a negative effect on the 
efficiency of the mechanisms used to achieve society’s redistibutive objectives. It could be desirable to 
redesign those mechanisms taking into account their impact on grocery prices in poor neighborhoods.
7  
 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a theoretical model explaining both grocery-
shopping decision and pricing by stores. In section 3 we turn to the empirical evidence, we analyze the 
results and discuss some of the implications. We conclude in section 4. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL  MODEL 
 
 
2.1 THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Consider a world consisting of a linear neighborhood with N consumers uniformly distributed over the 
segment [-1, 1].  A local store with market power is located at point 0 and we denote a consumer’s 
location or distance to that store by d. Hence, d ~ U [-1, 1]. Consumers are also heterogeneous in income 
y > 0, with y ~ U [yL, yH] for the N consumers. For simplicity, we assume that yH – yL = 1. We also 
assume that the d and y distributions are independent.  Any consumer can be identified by his 





                                                     
6 Sexton (1973) also shows that mobility constraints measured by proportion of single parent families may make comparison 
shopping more costly and therefore lead poorer people paying more.   
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2.2 THE CONSUMERS’ PROBLEM 
 
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of three goods: food, f, car, c, and some composite good, 
x.
8 For simplicity, we assume that food and cars can only be consumed in discrete quantities:  f ∈ {0,1} 
and c ∈{0,1}. As for the composite good, it can be consumed in any non-negative amount, x ≥ 0. 
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Thus, it is assumed that food cannot be dispensed with.  All individuals will be consuming food so the 
variations in the utility level they will achieve will depend on their consumption of c and x. In particular, 
they will have to choose whether to buy a car or not.  Assuming that w(c) = w, a consumer will have U 
(1, 0, x) = γ + ln(x) if he does not buy a car and U (1, 1, x) = γ + w + ln(x) if he does. 
 
When buying food f, consumers have two choices.  They may prefer to not buy a car (which sells at 
price q), and to go to the local store where they will pay a price p for their unit of food, this price p 
including a premium for market power.  Assuming the marginal cost of food is constant and equal to m, 
they would then pay p  ≥  m.  While going to the local store can be achieved without a car, it is 
nevertheless costly to get there.  We assume that going to the local store involves a traveling cost t by 
unit of distance d so that total traveling costs are t*d. 
 
The other option for buying food is to use a car, bought at price q, and to travel at no cost to a 
competitive store located outside the neighborhood.  (We could assume that the price q includes the cost 
of the car plus the cost of driving to the competitive store.)  Once at the competitive store, they can buy 
food at a price equal to the marginal cost m.  
 
As mentioned earlier, assuming that consumers have to buy food the decision they face is then to incur 
the cost of a car or not. A consumer buying a car (C) faces a budget constraint given by: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
7 This potential temporal adjustment by governments contrasts with the spatial indexation of transfer payments. On this last 
topic see Glaeser (1998). 
8 We can see car as any transportation mode or as a rental price for transportation. Note that an alternative interpretation of 
our model would be to view the price q as the cost of gathering information on prices prevailing at more than one store.  
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(2)   m+ q + x = y 
 
The utility of this consumer is then: 
 
(3)     UC = γ + w + ln(y – m- q) 
 
As for not buying a car (NC), it implies the following budget constraint: 
 
(4)     p+ td + x = y 
 
And the utility of the consumer in this case is: 
 
(5)   UNC = γ + ln(y – p - td) 
 
Hence, UC  ≥ UNC leads to using a car and shopping at the competitive store.  We assume equality leads 
to owning a car because of an infinitesimal advantage. Using (3) and (5), we obtain that a consumer 
should use a car if: 
(6)   w+ ln(y – m - q)  ≥ ln(y - p – td) 
 
Simplifying (6) using log rules and z = e
w leads to the conclusion that a consumer with characteristics 
(d, y) will buy a car and shop for food at the competitive store if:    
 
(7)     y  ≥  y* ( d) = α – βp – δd 
 
where α =  z(m + q) / (z-1) > 0 ; β = 1 /( z – 1) > 0 and δ =  t  /( z – 1) > 0. 
 
Therefore consumers with characteristics (d, y) such that y ≥ y*(d) use a car and shop at the competitive 
store while consumers with characteristics (d, y) such that y < y*(d) buy from the local monopoly. 
 
From eq. (7) we obtain:∂ y* / ∂ d < 0; ∂y*  / ∂q > 0 ; ∂ y* / ∂m > 0; ∂y* / ∂p < 0 ; ∂ y* / ∂ t < 0. 
 




Thus, the critical level of income, y*, above which one buys a car is smaller the further one is located 
from the local store.  Also, the critical level of income and the number of consumers shopping at the 
local monopoly both increase (decrease) whenever costs of shopping locally decrease (increase) and/or 
costs of shopping at the outside competitive store increase. A similar and opposite statement can be 
made for the outside competitive store.  Obviously, any shopper that stops shopping locally will shop at 
the competitive store (and vice-versa). 
 
 
2.3 THE DEMAND FOR THE LOCAL MONOPOLY 
 
Using distributions on y and d and y* as given by eq. (7), the numbers of consumers going to the local 
monopoly and the competitive store can be computed. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that over the segment [0, 1]. The proportion of consumers not using cars, λ(p), and 
shopping locally is given by the area under y* and over yL.  Since all consumers are located on [1,-1] it is 
sufficient to double the obtained proportion to have the total proportion of consumers not buying cars. 
Moreover, we normalize N = 1 so that that proportion is then the number of consumers shopping locally.  
We have: 
 
(8)   λ(p) = α – βp - yL – δ / 2 
This represents the total number of consumers shopping locally over the segment [0, 1]. 
 
By symmetry, the total number of consumers not using a car and buying one unit of food from the local 
store is: 
 
(9)   D(p) = 2 λ(p) = 2 (α - yL - 2 βp) - δ  
 























































2.4 THE LOCAL MONOPOLY’S PROBLEM 
 
The problem faced by the local monopoly is: 
 
(10)   Max π = (p-m) D(p) 
   p 
 
The first order condition is: 
 
(11)    D(p) + (p-m) D’(p) = 0 
 
Using the demand given by eq. (9) one obtains: 
 
(12)   p* = (α - δ / 2 - yL  ) * (1 / 2β) + m / 2 
 
Replacing for the defined values of α, β, and δ we get
9: 
 
(13)   p* = 1 / 4 * [ 2 (z + 1) m + 2zc – 2(z-1) yL – t] 
 
Interesting results can be derived from eq.(13).  First, as should be expected the price is increasing in the 
marginal cost m.  Second, if the cost of using a car (transportation) increases, consumers shop more 
locally and this leads to a higher local price.  Third, as the value of a unit of distance (t) to the store 
increases, the local store should decrease its price to compensate that additional cost.  Finally, and most 
interestingly, the local price is decreasing in the lower income level yL.  Therefore, if the distribution of y 
shifts to the right from [yL, yH] to [yL + ε, yH + ε] then local price should decrease as more consumers go 
to the competitive store. The explanation within the presented model is that lower incomes lead to fewer 
transportation choices and create lock-in effects. 
 
We will test this last result in two ways.  First, if one examines the income distribution on a weekly basis 
(weekly available money) and views the money available to social welfare recipients as the lower bound 
                                                     




of the distribution, is it true that prices are higher when social welfare recipients have just received their 
checks (as claimed by some welfare defense groups), or is it rather that prices are higher a few weeks 
later when  welfare recipients have spent part of their monthly benefit and are then relatively poorer (as 
predicted by our model)? Second, is it the case that local stores in “low income” neighborhoods sell at 
higher prices?  Or “technically” speaking, are areas with income distributions more to the left facing 
higher local prices? We now turn to the empirical study of these questions. 
 
 
3.  ECONOMETRICS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
3.1   DATA 
 
3.1.1 PRICES AND COSTS
10   
 
Observations on prices for 31 products were collected at seven grocery stores in the Montreal area over 
a period of 26 consecutive weeks from November 6, 2000, through May 6, 2001.  Observations on a 
similar set of 29 products were collected at four grocery stores in the Bangor, Maine area over 26 
consecutive weeks from November 10, 2001 through May 5, 2002.
11 Therefore, the Canadian 
observational structure represents a pooling of 26 time series observations for each of 217 product-store 
cross-sectional units (5 642 observations) while the American structure represents a pooling of 26 time 
series observations for each of 116 product-store cross-sectional units (3 016 observations). 
  
Corresponding observations on product cost were collected based on wholesale prices in Montreal and 
in Bangor. These costs were collected to account for the fact that prices variations may simply reflect 
lower or higher costs (due for example to seasonal factors).
12 Moreover, costs should reflect the average 
price of a product across stores which can explain why the prices change given the entire market 
situation and not only based on one particular store situation. Price and cost data for each product was 
expressed in terms of a common base unit (e.g.: ounce, gram, pound, kilogram). Table 1 (in appendix) 
lists the products and their corresponding product type category for the Canadian and the American 
samples.  
 
                                                     
10 The list of visited stores for regular and wholesale prices is available upon request. 
11Days of the week are not important because prices are constant throughout the week.  
12 See Macdonald (2000) for a study on seasonal price variations.  
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The grocery stores were chosen following predetermined criteria. The most popular stores were chosen 
in order to: 1) represent well each group of retailers; 2) cover the entire market; 3) obtain a diversity in 
the type of clientele (welfare recipients or not).  
 
The choice of products was done according to the criteria used by Glazer (1981), Lanoie et al. (1994) 
and Tanguay et al. (1995). First, each product was available to consumers throughout the evaluation 
period. Second, each product is the object of large sales volumes permitting therefore a sufficiently high 
frequency to justify an analysis of price fluctuations. Third, changes in prices could be made at low cost 
for the retailer. Prices being easily changed week by week, there is little constraint on their fluctuations. 
Fourth, publicity was taken into account for each product. To do so we added a criterion of “normal 
publicity” which should minimize differences between the products due to the fact that some benefit 
from more publicity than others. Fifth, we controlled for homogeneity of the products across time, 
variety and quality.  
 
Finally, the time period of six months was chosen to capture the short-term effects more than the 
changes in the structure of the industry and to minimize the seasonal effects due to harvesting.   
  
3.1.2 SOCIAL WELFARE PAYMENTS AND FOOD ASSISTANCE IN QUEBEC AND IN MAINE 
 
Social welfare checks in Montreal and in the province of Quebec are issued on the first day of the month 
unless this day falls on a weekend or holiday, in which case the checks are issued on the last non-holiday 
weekday preceding the first day of the month. The recipients are unrestricted in the expenditures they 
can make with these funds. These social security benefits are the major source of revenue for people on 
social welfare.   
 
The prevailing system of food assistance in the Bangor region (and in Maine in general) is different in 
many regards. First, a food stamp system helps people purchase items at food stores.  These stamps are 
available if you work or not, as long as you can prove that your income and assets are sufficiently low. 
Also, these stamps are not given to beneficiaries all at the same time.  Beneficiaries are divided into five 
groups: each of these groups receiving their stamps at different dates in a period of 5 to 7 days that may 
overlap two weeks. Finally, each beneficiary receives stamps at different dates each month (eg: August 
12th, September 14th, October 17th, etc.). Second, social welfare given in the form of money is 
established on a case-by-case basis and amounts are paid depending on some socio-economics  
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characteristic (like being handicapped, being a single mother, etc…). The payments are usually made at 
the beginning of each month but not necessarily all at the same time. Finally, social security payments in 
the United States are distributed over several weeks of each month.
13 Hence, this relatively diffuse 
timing pattern contrasts strongly with the relatively concentrated timing pattern in Montreal and 
therefore provides a natural experimental setting in which to estimate any price effects associated with 
the timing pattern of social welfare check issue in Montreal.   
 
 To capture any timing effects, the 26 time series observations in both samples were assigned to a week 
of the month as follows. If the calendar date on which an observation was collected was 1-7, then the 
observation was assigned to the first week of the month.  If the calendar date was 8-14, then the 
observation was assigned to the second week of the month.  Calendar dates of 15-21 were assigned the 
three week of the month; and dates of 22-28 were assigned the fourth week of the month.   Dates of 29-
31 were assigned the fifth week of the month.  We code five week-of-month (0, 1) dummy variables to 
reflect this timing pattern.  We create a “week-of-check” (0,1) dummy variable for the Montreal sample 
that takes on a value of unity if the timing of an observation falls within the week of check issue and 
zero otherwise.  This dummy variable has a value of unity in the first, or the fifth, week of the month.  
This pattern has a nice feature in that it permits us to estimate a week-of-check effect that is separate 
from a more general week-of-month effect. If we were to find these more general effects also exist in the 
Bangor sample, then this result would reinforce the conclusion that they are not related to the timing of 
social welfare check issuance in the Montreal sample. Conversely,  any estimated week-of-check effect 
is likely to reflect purely an effect from the timing concentration of social welfare check issuance in 
Montreal. 
 
3.1.3 OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
In addition to the price and cost observations and the (0, 1) dummy variables created to represent week-
of-month and week-of-check effects, we have collected observations on other relevant variables and 
placed them within our time series cross-section data structure.  These include: (1)  a measure of each 
store’s size (building plus parking lot);  (2) a set of (0,1) dummy variables for product types (meat, fruits 
and vegetables, dairy products, cereal products, cleaning products, paper products, and other products 
(see Table 1 for details);  and (3) a set of socio-economic variables. Given our theoretical model, the 
socio-economic variables were chosen to account for mobility constraints and poverty. For the seven 
                                                     
13 See http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/2002calendar.htm  
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Montreal stores, the socio-economic variables include measures of percentage of single-parent families, 
percentage of the population that has less than nine years of schooling population.  These data are taken 
from the last census of the City of Montreal electorate districts done in 1996 for each of the seven 
stores’ areas. For the four Bangor area stores, the socio-economic variables include measures of 
percentage of single-parent families and percentage of households that own their unit.
14 These data are 
taken from the 2000 U.S. decennial census for the towns/cites in which each store is located.  Because 
two of the four stores are located in the same town, the variation observed for these socio-economic 
factors is relatively limited in the American data.  Table 2 provides definitions for all variables. Table 3 
presents the corresponding summary statistics for the Canadian and the American samples. Both tables 
are in the Appendix. 
 
3.2  ECONOMETRIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Our data structure is a time series cross-sectional one with T=26 consecutive weekly time series 
observations on each of 217 product-store cross-sections for Montreal and 116 product-store cross-
sections for Bangor. In both the Canadian and American cases, we have T < N.  This structure limits the 
statistical models that are available to us.  In general, for a time series cross-section data structure, there 
are a number of models that can be considered including   Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with cross-
section fixed effects; Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with random effects, and various other 
FGLS with cross-section heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and inter-cross-section error correlation.  
 
The model with inter-cross-section error correlation is not feasible with our data structure because T < 
N, as is well-known.
15  We specify instead a model with cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, common 
autocorrelation, and fixed effects.
16 Given the large number of product-store cross-sections in both data 
                                                     
14 In all regressions, average household income was not used because it was available only for the year 1990 for the 
American data. Moreover, Canadian average income by store was highly correlated with the percentage of single-parent 
families and the percentage of the population that has less than nine years of schooling. Given that only the percentage of 
single-parent families was also available for the U.S. for year 2000 we chose to go with that common variable. Other socio-
economic variables were chosen to eliminate strong multicollinearity which could have led to singular matrix problems and 
failed estimations. For instance this is why a population variable is not included in the American regressions.  
15 See Greene (2000, p. 608) and Beck, et al. (1993). 
16 We chose to estimate a fixed effects model structure rather than a random effects structure because we wish to make 
inferences conditional on precisely the product categories delineated in our samples.  If we were to repeat our analysis for a 
subsequent set of 26 weeks, we would sample precisely the same products (e.g., ground beef, whole chicken, bananas, 
onions, etc.) and assign them to precisely the same product categories (e.g., meat, fruits and vegetables, etc.).  The products 
and product type categories are fixed and do not represent random draws, in repeated samples, from a population of products 
and product types [Hsiao (1986, pp. 41-43)].  Results from OLS and FGLS model estimates with cross-sectional 




sets, we estimate fixed effects for the following product type categories: meat, fruits and vegetables, 
dairy products, cereal products, cleaning products, and paper products.  The reference group for these 
main effects is the others products category.  Although fixed effects defined for each product-store 
combination can be feasibly implemented with our data sets, we are also interested in estimating 
interaction effects for week-of-check and product.  If we define the fixed effects as product-store 
combinations rather than as product types, we leave ourselves with 36 observations (or less in the 
autocorrelation models) with which to estimate these important interaction effects.  In order to expand 
the observational base for the estimation of these interaction effects, we have chosen to specify fixed 
effects based on product types.  It should also be recognized that store-specific effects related to store 
size are controlled for in all of our models.  In addition, the socio-economic variables take on values that 
are store specific; and this feature of our data structure and models also involves store-wise 
observational variation.  For these reasons, we believe that our decision to specify fixed effects across 
product types is reasonable.   
 
We used this product type fixed effects model to explore a number of specifications involving various 
sets of right hand side variables.  For each specification, we modeled the continuous variables (r.g., 
price, cost, store-size, population) in natural units and in natural logarithm units.  The final Canadian and 
American models presented in Table 4 represent specifications selected on the basis of the significance 
of variables conditional on the presence of week-of-month, and in the Canadian case, week-of-check 
main effects and important interaction effects.   
 
 
3.3   RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.3.1 CANADIAN RESULTS 
 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the linear and logarithmic specifications for the Canadian and 
American samples.  The statistically significant estimated positive effect of cost and the magnitude of 
the estimates across all four specifications seem reasonable.  The statistically significant estimated 
negative effect of storesize suggests that economies of scale at the store level exist.  The estimated fixed 
effects by product type are all statistically significant vis-à-vis the reference group:  other products.  The 
overall fits of all specifications are very good. These results lend support to these statistical models of 
local grocery prices in Montreal and Bangor and suggest that the specifications are appropriate and can  
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be relied on to give reasonable estimates of the effects on which this study is focused: week-of-month 
and week-of-check effects. 
 
The statistically significant estimated week-of-month main effects in the linear specification for the 
Canadian sample indicate that the average price is between three and fourteen cents higher in the first, 
third, fourth, and fifth weeks of the month in contrast to the second week.  Moreover, there is a 
statistically significant main effect on price in the week of social welfare check issue which is negative. 
Because the week-of-check is typically the first week-of-month, this negative effect offsets the positive 
main effect associated with the first week-of-month main effect.  A Wald test for the restriction that the 
sum of these two effects is zero produces a chi-square test statistic value of 2.35 with a corresponding p-
value of 0.13.  We conclude that in most of our first week-of-month observations, there is no statistically 
significant price effect relative to the price in the second week-of-month.  When the week-of-check 
coincides with the fifth week-of-month, the positive week-of-month main effect is offset as well.  A 
Wald test for the restriction that the sum of these two effects is zero produces a chi-square test statistic 
value of 1.39 with a corresponding p-value of 0.24.  However, given the limited number of coincidences 
in our sample of week-of-check and fifth week-of-month, the positive and significant fifth week-of-
month main effect usually is present.
17   
 
The estimates of the logarithmic specification for the Canadian sample are also presented in Table 4 and 
generally confirm the linear model results.  Our preferred model is once again FGLS-HA for the same 
reasons as given above for the linear model.  As with the linear model, the overall fit is very good as 
evidenced by an R-square of 0.996.  In this logarithmic model, the statistically significant estimated 
positive effect of cost on price, the magnitude of the estimate and the statistically significant estimated 
negative effect of Storesize (suggesting economies of scale) all seem reasonable. The estimated fixed 
effects by product type are all statistically significant. These suggest that the specification is appropriate 
for our purposes. 
 
The statistically significant estimated week-of-month main effects indicate that the average price is 0.7 
percent higher in the third week of the month and 2.3 percent higher in the fifth week, in contrast to the 
second week.  This is a similar finding to that in the linear model; however, there is no statistically 
significant main effect on price in the week of social welfare check issue in the logarithmic model.  
                                                     
17 The correlation coefficient between the first (fifth) week-of-month dummy variable and the week-of-check dummy 
variable is 0.57 (0.53) indicating that no severe collinearity exists for this group of variables that would substantially reduce 
the precision of the corresponding estimates.  
 
15
Considering this difference, we can conclude that both models suggest that prices tend to rise later in the 
month in Montreal and that week-of-check issue is associated with lower prices.  The only evidence 
against this general statement in our sample is the statistically significant estimated positive interaction 
effect for week-of-check and dairy products in the logarithmic model.  Other than this, week-of-check 
effects on price are negative or zero.  These additional findings that week-of-check has negative main 
effects is evidence for the hypothesis that market power plays a role in higher prices in our sample.   
 
We conclude that the typical pattern over the month in Montreal is for prices generally to rise.  We also 
conclude that prices are lower at the time checks are issued.  Moreover, there are two statistically 
significant and negative week-of-check interaction effects with product type (meat and 
fruits/vegetables). 
 
These results validate the theoretical findings of our model. Local stores’ market power increases over a 
given month because: i) mobility is decreasing in income levels and ii) available weekly funds are lower 




The results for the socio-economic factors are all statistically significant.  Population has a negative 
effect on average price; and more interesting given the objective of this study, both the incidence of 
single-parent families and of households with less than nine years of schooling is positive and 
statistically significant.  This may imply that poorer households face higher average prices; or there may 
be a common correlation with other factors that are present in such lower-income neighbourhoods. That 










                                                     
18 If mobility would be constant in incomes, then market power would not play a role in higher prices in our sample. Another 
potential explanation for the obtained empirical results could then be based on operating costs. Because we don’t expect 
service costs to increase later in the month and there is no evidence on higher operating costs in poorer neighbourhoods, this 




3.3.2 AMERICAN RESULTS AND COMPARISONS 
 
The corresponding estimates based on the American sample are presented in Table 4 as well. The main 
reason for including American observations (on four stores in the Bangor, Maine area) is to provide a 
natural experiment with respect to week-of-month effects.  Since social welfare payments (e.g., social 
security, income maintenance, and food stamps) are distributed over several weeks in a month in the 
U.S., any week-of-month pattern could be compared with any pattern found in the Montreal data and 
netted out to leave a pattern that could be induced by the particular timing pattern of social welfare 
payments in Canada. The models have very good overall fits with R-squares of 0.983 (linear 
specification) and 0.996 (logarithmic specification).  The estimates of the linear specification indicate no 
week-of-month main effects. The estimates of the logarithmic specification exhibit only a negative and 
statistically significant main effect for week four.  
 
Since the issuance of social welfare checks in the U.S. is spread over a number of weeks each month, in 
contrast to the primarily first-week-of-the-month issuance pattern in Montreal, the relatively limited 
week-of-month price variation in Bangor compared to Montreal suggests that there are different factors 
operating in Montreal that induce intra-monthly price variation that are not present in Bangor. Overall, 
we believe that the American results reinforce our conclusions based on the Canadian data regarding the 
evidence for price effects induced by the focused timing of Canadian social welfare payments. Hence, 
the evidence in our samples supports some social welfare payment induced price effects in Montreal. 
The typical pattern over the month in Montreal is for prices generally to rise and for prices to be lower at 
the time of check issuance.   
 
Finally, like in the Canadian case, estimates of both the linear and logarithmic specifications with 
American data indicate main effects that are positive and statistically significant for incidence of single-
parent families. However, the positive incidence of homeownership on prices may cast some doubt on 
the interpretation of the Canadian results concerning higher average prices for neighbourhoods with 
higher percentages of single-parent families (or lesser schooled households).
19  Nevertheless, Sexton 
(1973) also showed that a higher proportion of single parent families may make comparison shopping 
more costly and therefore lead to less mobility.  
 
 
                                                     
19On the other hand, they may reflect the impact of higher rents on operating costs and therefore prices. Recall that the cost 




Table 4:  FGLSHA Estimates for Montreal, Quebec and Bangor, Maine 
 









 Variable  Coefficient t-Stat  Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient  t-Stat  Coefficient  t-Stat 
CONSTANT  0.18  2.13  5.62  18.35 -0.07 -0.80  1.24  33.91 
Store-specific 
variables                         
COST  1.18  237.87  0.71  310.42  1.12  211.40  0.93  246.78 
STORESIZE  0.00  -2.33  -0.02  -3.87  -0.00  -9.37  -0.09  -20.76 
WOM/WOC main 
effects                         
WOMS1  0.09  5.89 0.01  1.38  0.10  1.02  0.03 0.73 
WOMS3  0.03  3.22 0.00  1.38  -0.01  -0.68  -0.01 -1.89 
WOMS4  0.03  3.01  0.01  2.38 -0.00 -0.06  -0.01  -3.61 
WOMS5  0.13  5.99  0.01  2.08 -0.00 -0.23  -0.00 -1.05 
WOC  -0.30  -2.19 -0.09  -0.87            
Socio-economic 
variables                     
POP  0.00  -14.50  -0.60  -13.65         
POWN          1.02  8.91     
LPOWN              .032  13.79 
P1PFAM  0.02  13.50  0.13  2.24  1.45  7.99  0.25  23.68 
PLT9  0.03  12.00  0.15  5.21         
Product type main 
effects                         
MEAT  1.58  53.91  0.40  55.40  -0.54  -30.13  -0.18  -23.21 
FRVEG  0.36  32.42  0.12  14.47  -0.34  -19.19  -0.03  -4.17 
DAIRY  0.16  8.19  0.15  22.29  -0.54  -25.76  -0.19  -18.55 
CEREAL  -0.30  -12.96  0.03  3.73  0.97  43.69  0.61  105.40 
CLEANPROD  -0.04  -2.61  0.04  4.25  -0.66  -35.86  -0.21  -55.26 
PAPERPROD  -0.34  -9.31  -0.02  -5.01  -0.54  -30.14  -0.22  -35.55 
Interaction effects                          
WOC?* P1PFAM  0.00  1.84  -0.02  0.76  -0.03  -0.26  0.02 1.23 
WOC?*PLT9 0.01  1.91  0.00  0.28  -0.17  -1.13  0.02 0.42 
WOC?*MEAT  -0.19  -2.99 -0.01  -0.78  -0.00  -0.19  -0.00 -0.17 
WOC?*FRVEG  -0.07  -3.13 0.01  0.72  0.01  0.37  0.02 1.16 
WOC?*DAIRY 0.02  0.55  0.04  2.68 0.00 0.10  0.00 0.11 
WOC?*CEREAL 0.04  0.71  0.03  1.74  -0.02  -0.40  -0.00 -0.10 
WOC?*CLEANPROD -0.04  -1.26  0.02  0.71 -0.03 -0.88  0.01 0.10 




Rho-3 Rho-1  =  0.56  51.33 
 
 
Rho-1 = 0.41 




22.18  Rho-1 = 0.44  21.58 
 
Rho-1 = 0.45 
Rho-2 = 0.12 




Weighted Statistics                   
R-squared    0.956    0.996    0.983    0.996 
Durbin-Watson     2.094    2.139    1.946    2.161 














We presented an analysis of the evolution of pricing of grocery stores in relation to the sequence of 
monetary flows given to welfare recipients. We obtained two main results. First, we showed that a more 
concentrated timing of welfare payments may lead to rising prices over a month. Second, prices are 
lower at the time of check issuance. We believe these results are caused by social welfare recipients 
having progressively more limited transportation choices over a month (or when they have less money) 
and therefore being more captive of local grocery stores. In other words, poorer persons pay higher 
prices for food because of the exploitation of market power in the face of relatively low mobility. This 
effect is independent of any price changes which may be due to potentially higher costs of operation in 
poorer neighborhoods (which are neither ruled out or proven to exist). 
 
Therefore, some potential efficiency losses may exist given the more restrictive timing of social welfare 
payments in Canada compared to the timing prevailing in the United States. The frequency at which the 
social welfare payments are made could have a negative effect on the attainment of the redistributive 
objectives. Given that one of the concerns of governments is the fair redistribution of wealth to poorer 
individuals and the attainment of this in an efficient manner, these results could justify reforming the 
way social welfare payments are given in order to minimize the negative effects grocery store pricing 
have on the redistribution of wealth. This constitutes important and relevant information for 
governments in countries in which welfare payments are concentrated through time. Governments 
should make sure that their policy timing does not permit some economic agents, such as grocery stores, 
to interfere with the goal of the social policies they implement. 
 
For instance the Quebec’s government pays all welfare benefits in one day. It might consider revising 
that method if it causes some unvoluntary harm to poor people’s well-being. Because we have shown 
that grocery stores indeed have opportunistic behaviors, the government can for example spread the 
payments of welfare benefits throughout the month. Nevertheless, the present research doesn’t constitute 
a sufficient condition to change the way the system works. What would be required for sufficiency 
would be a complete evaluation of the costs and benefits of all alternative policies of distributing the 







Table 1:  Canadian and American Products and Corresponding Product Types 
Product in Montreal, Quebec, Canada  OPPr  Products in Bangor, Maine, USA 
Meats     Meats    
Beef Ground Chuck 80%      Beef Ground Chuck 80%     
Chicken Drumsticks      Chicken Drumsticks     
Whole Chicken cat. A      Whole Chicken grade A     
Fresh Atlantic Salmon      Fresh Atlantic Salmon     
Canned tuna     Canned tuna    
Fruits and vegetables     Fruits and vegetables    
Bananas      Bananas     
White mushrooms     White Mushrooms    
Vegetable juice         
Apple juice      Apple Juice     
Iceberg lettuce     Iceberg lettuce    
Yellow onions      Yellow Onions     
Macintosh apples          
Others     Others    
Peanut butter      Peanut Butter    
Soft drink      Soft Drink    
Instant coffee      Instant coffee    
Sparkling Water     Spring Water    
Spring water         
Ketchup     Ketchup    
Dairies     Dairies    
Cream cheese     Cream cheese    
Cheese slices     Cheese slices    
Large white eggs     Large White Eggs     
Cereals     Cereals    
Spaghetti  1     Spaghetti   1    
Spaghetti  2     Spaghetti   2     
Spaghetti  3                       
White rice     White rice    
Cleaning products     Cleaning products    
Powder detergent (clothing)     Powder Detergent(95 loads, 80 loads)    
      " (120 loads)    
Bleach (1 gal.)    Bleach (/gal)    
“    " (174oz)    
Paper products     Paper products    
Toilet paper: 8 and 12 rolls    Toilet paper: 6 rolls and 12 rolls    
Kleenex     Kleenex     
              






Table 2:  Variable Names and Definitions 
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
A.  Common to Canadian and American Data Sets 
PRICE  Product price ($/unit) 
COST  Product wholesale cost ($/unit) 
STORESIZE  Size of store and parking lot in square feet (Montreal) / in thousand square feet (Bangor) 
WOMS1  Equals unity if observation taken during first seven days (1-7) of month and zero otherwise 
WOMS2  Equals unity if observation taken during second seven days (8-14) of month and zero 
otherwise 
WOMS3  Equals unity if observation taken during third seven days (15-21) of month and zero otherwise 
WOMS4  Equals unity if observation taken during fourth seven days (22-28) of month and zero 
otherwise 
WOMS5  Equals unity if observation taken during days 29-31of month and zero otherwise 
POP  Population in store area (Montreal) / Population in town in which store is located (Bangor) 
P1PFAM  Percentage of one-parent households 
MEAT  Equals unity if product type is "meat" and zero otherwise 
FRVEG  Equals unity if product type is "fruits and vegetables" and zero otherwise 
DAIRY  Equals unity if product type is "dairy" and zero otherwise 
CEREAL  Equals unity if product type is "cereal" and zero otherwise 
CLEANPROD  Equals unity if product type is "cleaning products" and zero otherwise 
PAPERPROD  Equals unity if product type is "paper products" and zero otherwise 
LPRICE  Natural logarithm of PRICE 
LCOST  Natural logarithm of COST 
LSTORESIZE  Natural logarithm of STORESIZE 
LPOP  Natural logarithm of POPULATION 
LP1PFAM  Natural logarithm of P1PFAM 
B.  Unique to Canadian Data 
WOC  Equals unity if observation taken during seven day period in which social welfare checks were 
issued 
PLT9  Percentage of householders in store area with less than nine years of schooling 
LPLT9  Natural logarithm of PLT9 
C.  Unique to American Data 
POWN  Proportion of householders in town in which store is located who own their home 
LPOWN  Natural logarithm of POWN 

















Table 3:  Statistics 
Variable  Canadian Sample  American Sample 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum   Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  
PRICE  3.114  2.912  0.250 19.990  2.290  2.747 0.330 24.990 
COST 2.424  1.926  0.263  7.960  1.787  2.444  0.330  17.790 
STORESIZE 92473.0 93105.7 7620  268128 69.2  38  9  107 
WOMS1 0.231  0.421  0.000  1.000  0.234  0.424  0.000  1.000 
WOMS2 0.231  0.421  0.000  1.000  0.228  0.420  0.000  1.000 
WOMS3 0.231  0.421  0.000  1.000  0.233  0.423  0.000  1.000 
WOMS4 0.231  0.421  0.000  1.000  0.230  0.421  0.000  1.000 
WOMS5 0.077  0.267  0.000  1.000  0.075  0.264  0.000  1.000 
WOC  0.231  0.421  0.000  1.000           
POP 26862.3  2158.2  23887  29880  14838.8  10087.4  8130  31473 
P1PFAM 40.571  8.396  31.000  57.000  0.325  0.033  0.291  0.376 
PLT9  23.588  7.044  12.000  33.000           
POWN            0.511  0.055  0.475  0.599 
MEAT 0.181  0.385  0.000  1.000  0.213  0.409  0.000  1.000 
FRVEG 0.254  0.435  0.000  1.000  0.239  0.427  0.000  1.000 
DAIRY 0.073  0.259  0.000  1.000  0.151  0.358  0.000  1.000 
CEREAL 0.104  0.305  0.000  1.000  0.027  0.162  0.000  1.000 
CLEANPROD 0.104  0.305  0.000  1.000 0.079 0.270  0.000  1.000 
PAPERPROD 0.067  0.250  0.000  1.000 0.064  0.245  0.000  1.000 
OTHER       0.000  1.000       0.000  1.000 
LPRICE 0.852  0.718  -1.386  2.995  0.497  0.731  -1.109  3.218 
LCOST 0.564  0.829  -1.338  2.074  0.216  0.733  -1.109  2.879 
LSTORESIZE  10.696  1.339  8.939 12.499  3.949  0.906 2.197 4.673 
LPOP 10.195  0.080  10.081  10.305  9.418  0.571  9.003  10.357 
LP1PFAM 3.683  0.200  3.434  4.043  -1.130  0.098  -1.234  -0.978 
LPLT9  3.110  0.328  2.485  3.497           
LPOWN          -0.676 0.103  -0.744  -0.512 
               
Number of 
Observations 
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